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2.1 "-approximation of 2-player zero-sum games
In this lecture we give a randomized "ctitious play" algorithm for obtaining an approx-
imate solution for 2-player zero-sum games.
2.1.1 matrix games
A 2-player zero-sum game, or a matrix game, is dened by a matrix A 2 Rmn, called the
payo matrix. There are two players with opposing interests: the row player (minimizer)
and the column player (maximizer). At each step of the play, the row player selects a
row i, and the column player selects a column j, then the row player pays to the column
player the value aij of the (i;j)th entry in the matrix. Suppose that the play continues
forever, how to play such a game?
Example 1. Consider the payo matrix
A =
2
4
1 0  1
0 0 0
 1 0 1
3
5:
Let us see what happens if the row player chooses row 1. Then, the column player
(being a maximizer) will choose the rst column. But then the row player (being a
minimizer) will switch to row 3. Then, the column player will nd it more protable to
switch to column 3, after which the row player will switch to row 1, resulting in a cycle!
This situation describes what is not an equilibrium. Examining the above matrix, the
row maxima are 1, 0, and 1, respectively. So if the row player chooses row 1, the column
player would guarantee 1, if the row player chooses row 2, then the column player would
guarantee 0, and so on. In general, if the row player chooses row i, then the column player
would guarantee maxj aij, and thus the row player should choose the row that minimizes
this maximum. Similarly, since the row minima are  1;0; 1, respectively, the column
player can guarantee maxj mini aij = 0. Since it happens in this example that these two
values are equal, there will be an equilibrium if the row player sticks to playing the 2nd
row and the column player sticks to playing the 2nd column.
An equilibrium or a saddle point is a pair of strategies for the two players such that
no player has incentive to switch, assuming that the other player does not switch. But is
there always a saddle-point in pure strategies as in Example 1. The answer is NO as the
following well-known example shows.
Example 2. Consider the payo matrix
A =

1  1
 1 1

:
Then mini maxj aij = 1 6=  1 = maxj mini aij.
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So what to do? Play with mixed strategies. That is, the row player chooses a proba-
bility vector x 2 Sm = fx 2 Rm : eTx = 1; x  0g, where e denotes the vector of all ones
of the appropriate dimension, and plays row i with probability xi. Similarly, the column
vector plays according to a probability vector y 2 Sn = fy 2 Rn : eTy = 1; y  0g.
Let us denote by A1;:::;Am the rows of A, by A1;:::;Am the columns of A, and by ei
the i-unit vector with the appropriate dimension. Then the expected value that the row
player would pay if she decided to play row i is
P
j aijyj = Aiy = eT
i Ay, and hence her
expected payo would be
P
i xiAiy = xTAy. Similarly, the expected payo of the column
player is xTAy. For instance, in Example 2 above, if both players choose (1
2; 1
2) as their
strategy, then the expected payo for both is 0. On the other hand, if the row player
chooses x = (1
3; 2
3), while the column player chooses y = (2
3; 1
3), the then payo is  1
9. Is
any of these two pairs of strategies an equilibrium? And does such an equilibrium exists
in general? The answer is YES as given by the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Von Neumann (1928)). For any matrix A 2 Rmn,
min
x2Sm
max
y2Sn
x
TAy = max
y2Sn
min
x2Sm
x
TAy: (2.1)
Denition 2.2 (Saddle point). A saddle point in a matrix game with payo matrix
A 2 Rmn, is a pair of strategies x 2 Sm and y 2 Sn such that
minx2Smx
TAy
 = max
y2Sn
(x
)
TAy: (2.2)
Such a pair will be also called an optimal pair.
Exercise 1. (i) Show that minx2Sm maxy2Sn xTAy  maxy2Sn minx2Sm xTAy.
(ii) Show that a pair of strategies x 2 Sm and y 2 Sn are optimal if and only if for
all i;j: (x)TAj  Aiy:
It is worth noting that a matrix game is equivalent to a pair of packing-covering linear
programs (LP's).
Exercise 2. Let v be the common value in the identity (2.1). Show that
v
 = minfv j x
TA  ve
T; x 2 Smg = maxfv j Ay  ve; y 2 Sng:
Let " 2 [0;1] be a given constant. We are interested in "-optimal strategies, dened
as follows.
Denition 2.3 ("-optimal strategies). A pair of strategies x 2 Sm and y 2 Sn is an
"-optimal pair for a matrix game with payo matrix A 2 Rmn if
max
y2Sn
(x
)
TAy  min
x2Sm
x
TAy
 + ": (2.3)
In this lecture, we consider the problem of nding approximate saddle points of matrix
games.
Input: A matrix A 2 Rmn and a desired accuracy "
Output: A pair of strategies x 2 Sm and y 2 Sn
Objective: x;y are "-equilibria
-approximation of zero-sum games
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2.1.2 ctitious play
Fictitious play is a method suggested by Brown in 1951 [Bro51] to obtain a saddle point for
a given matrix game. Iteratively, the minimizer and the maximizer maintain in X(t) 2 Zm
+
and Y (t) 2 Zn
+ the frequencies by which rows and columns have been used, respectively,
upto time t of the play. Then each player updates his/her strategy by applying the best
response, given the current opponent's strategy. The procedure is given below.
Algorithm 1 fictitious play
1. X(0) := 0 and Y (0) := 0
2. for t = 1;2;::: do
3. i := argminfA1Y (t   1);:::;AmY (t   1)g; X(t) := X(t   1) + ei
4. j := argmaxfX(t 1)TA1;:::;X(t 1)TAng; Y (t) := Y (t 1)+ej
Note that at each t, the vectors
X(t)
t and
Y (t)
t are feasible strategies. The convergence of
such pair of strategies, x = limt!1
X(t)
t , y = limt!1
Y (t)
t , was established by Robinson
[Rob51]. A bound of

2m+n
"
m+n 2
, where  = maxi;j jaijj, on the time needed for
convergence to an "-pair was obtained by Shapiro in 1958 [Sha58]. The tendency in the
literature is to believe that this time is bounded by O(
poly(n;m)
"2 ). A smoothed version of
this ctitious play, introduced in the next section, archives such a bound.
2.1.3 Randomized ctitious play
Grigoriadis and Khachiyan (1995) [GK95] introduced a randomized version of ctitious
play, in which the argmin and argmax operators in steps 3 and 4 above are replaced by
a smoothed selection which picks a row (respectively, a column) with probability that
decreases (respectively, increases) quickly as the current response of the opponent to
this row (respectively, column) increases. More precisely, given the current vectors of
frequencies X(t) 2 Zm
+ and Y (t) 2 Zn
+, the row and column players choose, respectively,
a row i and a column j according to the (so-called Gibbs) distributions:
pi(t)
jp(t)j
where pi(t) = e
 
"AiY (t 1)
2 and jp(t)j =
m X
i=1
pi(t) (2.4)
qj(t)
jq(t)j
where qj(t) = e
"X(t 1)T Aj
2 and jq(t)j =
n X
j=1
qj(t): (2.5)
Here is the algorithm. This will be the theme of most of the algorithms described in
the lectures on packing and covering LP's.
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Algorithm 2 randomized fictitious play
1. X(0) := 0 and Y (0) := 0
2. for t = 1;2;:::;T
def =
6ln(2nm)
"2 do
3. Pick i 2 [m] and j 2 [n] independently, with probabili-
ties
pi(t)
jp(t)j and
qj(t)
jq(t)j, respectively
4. X(t) := X(t   1) + ei; Y (t) := Y (t   1) + ej
5. return (
X(t)
t ;
Y (t)
t )
It is the smoothing step in line 3 that makes it possible to prove better bounds on the
number of iterations than those currently known for deterministic ctitious play.
The analysis, here and in all the algorithms considered in subsequent lectures, will
follow more or less the same framework: we dene a potential function
(t) = jp(t + 1)jjq(t + 1)j; (2.6)
and show that it does not increase by much from one iteration to the next. Then this
implies, by iterating, that the expected potential after t time steps is bounded by the
initial potential multiplied by some factor, which might depend exponentially on t. Since
the initial potential is the sum of some non-negative exponentials, each term in the sum is
bounded by the nal potential. Taking logs allows us to bound the error in approximation
at time t, as a function of t, and our choice of the terminating time T, when plugged
in this function, guarantees to make the error less than " as desired. The proof we give
here uses ideas from Grigoriadis and Khachiyan (1995) [GK95] and Koufogiannakis and
Young [KY07].
For the purpose of obtaining an approximation with an absolute error, we will assume
that all the entries of the matrix A are in some xed range, say [ 1;1]. Scaling the matrix
A by 1
, where the "width" parameter  is dened as  = maxi;j jaijj, and replacing "
by "
 in what follows, we get an algorithm that works without this assumption, but
whose running time is proportional to 2. We note that such dependence on the width
is unavoidable in all known algorithms that obtain "-approximate solutions and whose
running time is proportional to poly(1
"). An exception is when A is non-negative in which
this dependence can be removed as we shall see in a later lecture.
Exercise 3. Show that any matrix game (2.1) can be converted into an equivalent one
in which each entry in the matrix A is in [a;b], where a;b 2 R. Does the same reduction
work if we are aiming at an -approximate saddle point?
Theorem 2.4. Assuming A 2 [ 1;1]mn, algorithm randomized fictitious play
outputs "-optimal strategies, with probability at least 1
2. The total running time is
O(
(n+m)log(n+m)
"2 ).
Proof: The bound on the running time is obvious. So it remains to show that the pair
output by the algorithm is "-optimal. As mentioned above, we analyze the change in
the potential function (2.6). Note that, due to the random choices of the algorithm, the
potential function is a random variable. We will prove the following bound.
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Lemma 2.5. For t = 1;2;:::;
E[(t)]  E[(t   1)](1 +
"
6
2
)
2:
Then by iteration we get that E[(t)]  E[(0)](1 + "
6
2)2t  (0)e
"2t
3 , where the last
inequality follows by using the inequality 1+ x  ex, valid for all real x. This implies by
Markov's inequality that, with probability at least 1
2, after t iterations,
(t)  2e
"2
3 t(0): (2.7)
Note that (t) =
P
i;j e
"X(t)T Aj
2  
"AiY (t)
2 . Since each term in this sum is non-negative and
the sum is bounded by 2e
"2
3 t(0), we conclude that each term is also bounded by the
same bound. Taking logs and using (0) = nm, we get that
"X(t)TAj
2
 
"AiY (t)
2
 ln(2nm) +
"2t
3
:
or
X(t)T
t
A
j  Ai
Y (t)
t
+
2ln(2nm)
"t
+
2"
3
:
Using the value of t = T =
6ln(2nm)
"2 at the end of the last iteration, we get that
X(t)T
t Aj 
Ai
Y (t)
t +", implying (see Exercise 1(ii)) that the pair of strategies output by the algorithm
is "-optimal. 
It remains to prove Lemma 2.5.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. Fix an iteration t. Denote by X = X(t) and Y = Y (t)
the changes in the vectors X and Y in iteration t, that is, in step 4, we use the updates
X(t + 1) = X(t) + X and Y (t + 1) = Y (t) + Y .
In the following, we condition on the values of X(t   1) and Y (t   1) (so for the
moment, we will think that the only random events are those in step 3, and hence p(t),
q(t), and (t) are all constants). Let p(t) = (p1(t);:::;pm(t)) and q(t) = (q1(t);:::;qn(t)).
Then
E[X] =
p(t)
jp(t)j
and E[Y ] =
q(t)
jq(t)j
:
To estimate the change in (t   1), we estimate the changes in jp(t)j and jq(t)j.
jp(t + 1)j =
m X
i=1
pi(t + 1) =
m X
i=1
e
 
"AiY (t)
2 =
m X
i=1
e
 
"Ai(Y (t 1)+Y )
2
=
m X
i=1
pi(t)e
 
"AiY
2 : (2.8)
Exercise 4. Show that, for all  2 [ 1
2; 1
2], e  1 +  + 2
32.
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Note that
"AiY
2 2 [ 1
2; 1
2] since we have assumed that jaijj  1. Thus the fact in
Exercise 4, together with (2.8), implies that
jp(t + 1)j 
m X
i=1
pi(t)

1  
"AiY
2
+
"2
6
(AiY )
2


m X
i=1
pi(t)

1 +
"2
6
 
"AiY
2

= jp(t)j

1 +
"2
6
 
"p(t)TAY
2jp(t)j

;
where in the second inequality we used again the assumption that jaijj  1 and hence
(AiY )2  1. In fact, this is the only place where this assumption plays a role in the
analysis.
Taking the expectation with respect to Y , we get by linearity of expectation
E[jp(t + 1)j]  jp(t)j

1 +
"2
6
 
"p(t)TAq(t)
2jp(t)jjq(t)j

:
Similarly, we can derive
E[jq(t + 1)j]  jq(t)j

1 +
"2
6
+
"q(t)TATp(t)
2jq(t)jjp(t)j

:
Thus, using independence of X and Y , we have
E[(t)] = E[jp(t + 1)j]E[jq(t + 1)j]  jp(t)jjq(t)j
"
1 +
"2
6
2
+
"
2

1 +
"2
6

q(t)TATp(t)
jq(t)jjp(t)j
 
p(t)TAq(t)
jp(t)jjq(t)j

 
"2
4
q(t)TATp(t)
jq(t)jjp(t)j

p(t)TAq(t)
jp(t)jjq(t)j

:
Since
q(t)TATp(t)
jq(t)jjp(t)j =
p(t)TAq(t)
jp(t)jjq(t)j , we get that E[(t)]  (t 1)

1 + "2
6
2
. Recalling that this
expectation was conditional on the values of X(t   1) and Y (t   1), the lemma follows
by taking the expectation of both sides of this inequality with respect to X(t   1) and
Y (t   1). 
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